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A Second Sitting: Assessing the
Constitutionality and Desirability of
Allowing Retired Supreme Court Justices to
Fill Recusal-Based Vacancies on the Bench
Rebekah Saidman-Krauss*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Could we not have a provision in the law for some mechanism that
retired Supreme Court [J]ustices could be asked to sit on the Court when
there is a recusal," wondered former Supreme Court Justice John Paul
Stevens.' This question spurred Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy to draft
legislation that would create such a mechanism. 2 If enacted, Leahy's
proposed legislation would enable the active Justices on the Court to
select, by a majority vote, retired Justices to return to the Bench to fill
recusal-based vacancies. 3
Judicial recusal describes a judge's sua sponte withdrawal from a
case, 4 whereas disqualification refers to judicial removal that is required
by statute or prompted by a party's motion. These technical distinctions
notwithstanding, recusal and disqualification are governed by the same
federal standard and are often used interchangeably. 6
Historically, Supreme Court Justices have been disinclined to recuse
themselves, even when a litigant has moved for a Justice's
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2012.
1. David Ingram, Should Retired Justices Be Called Back to the Supreme Court?,
THE
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(June

16,

2010,

4:14

PM),

http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/should-retired-justices-be-called-back-tosupreme-court.html [hereinafter Should Retired Justices Be Called Back to the Supreme
Court?].
2. Id.
3. See S. 3781, 11Ith Cong. § 1 (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29,
2010).
4.

See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1390 (9th ed. 2009) (defining recusal as the

"[r]emoval of oneself as judge or policy-maker in a particular matter, esp. because of a
conflict of interest").
5. See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-OrientedApproach to
JudicialRecusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 532 n.5 (2005).
6. Id.
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disqualification.7 Common law doctrines such as the "duty to sit"8 and
the "rule of necessity"' effectively create recusal loopholes, allowing
judges to refrain from recusal in situations that would otherwise warrant
such action.' 0 Prior to 1974, Supreme Court Justices frequently invoked
these common law doctrines in support of their refusal to recuse."
In 1974, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 455 to curb widespread
judicial reliance on these common law doctrines.12 Despite Congress's
attempt to create a standard wherein judges would "err on the side of
recusal,"l 3 certain Justices have failed to comply.1 4 The Supreme Court,
in particular, has indicated that its "unique nature justifies a less
demanding recusal standard" than that which governs all other federal
judges.15
One famous instance reflecting this tendency for Supreme Court
Justices to- "refuse to recuse" occurred in 2004, when the Sierra Club
filed a motion for the recusal of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia

7. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.)
(denying motion to recuse); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2002)
(statement of Rehnquist, C.J.) (explaining that his son's partner status at a law firm
representing Microsoft in matters pending before the Court did not warrant Chief Justice
Rehnquist's recusal in those matters); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J., mem.) (relying on duty to sit doctrine in denial of respondents' motion to disqualify);
see also Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897 (1954) (Jackson,
J., concurring in denial of rehearing) (criticizing Justice Black's refusal to recuse from a
case argued by his former law partner); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND
His CRITICS 4 (1988) (noting that litigants often "objected to [Black's] participation in
cases reviewing the validity and meaning of statutes he had sponsored" as a Senator).
8. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
10. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REv.
589, 604-05 (1987) [hereinafter Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform].
11. See Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, supra note 10, at 606 n.63 (listing various
cases cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist illustrating widespread adherence to the duty to sit
doctrine).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351;
Stempel, supra note 8, at 607 (noting that "the revised section 455 expressly eliminated
the duty to sit doctrine").
13. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the
Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 813, 815 (2009) [hereinafter Chief William's Ghost] ("In
close cases, judges should err on the side of recusal in order to enhance public confidence
in the judiciary and to ensure that subtle, subconscious, or hard-to-prove bias, prejudice,
or partiality does not influence decision-making.").
14. See id at 907 (noting that Chief Justice Rehqnuist in Microsoft Corp. v. United
States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2002), Justice Scalia in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367
(2004), and the seven Justices who signed the Court's 1993 Statement of Recusal Policy,
see infra note 94, "deploy[ed] a doctrine that was supposed to have been abolished to
resist recusal and buttress a nonrecusal decision that is at least questionable if not clearly
erroneous.").
15. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 681
(2005).
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from the matter Cheney v. United States District Court.16 Justice Scalia
had recently accompanied former-Vice President Dick Cheney, a named
In denying Sierra
party in the action, on a duck hunting excursion.
Club's recusal motion, Justice Scalia reasoned that, although Sierra Club
questioned his impartiality, it did not do so "reasonably" in light of all
the relevant facts and circumstances.18 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded
that his recusal was unwarranted under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 455.19
Recently, the recusal practices of Supreme Court Justices have
garnered increasing media attention. 2 0 In October 2010, reporters
questioned whether Virginia Thomas's active role in partisan politics,
which has been characterized as "the most partisan role ever for a spouse
of a [Supreme Court] [J]ustice," 2 1 would raise recusal issues for her
22
husband, Justice Clarence Thomas.
In the controversial case of Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,2 3 Justice Thomas joined the 5-4 majority in issuing a
decision that reduced former campaign spending restrictions, thereby
allowing corporate entities to make unlimited expenditures. 2 4 Common
Cause, a liberal nonprofit advocacy organization, has suggested that
Justice Thomas may have had "an undisclosed financial conflict of
interest due to his wife's role as CEO of Liberty Central, a 501(c)(4)
16. Cheney, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
17. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. at 914-16, (Scalia, J., mem.) (explaining
circumstances surrounding duck-hunting excursion).
18. Id. at 926.
19. Id. (concluding that his recusal would not be "proper").
20. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Recuse Me, N.Y. TIMEs, May 4, 2011,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/recuse-me/ (discussing the merits of a
motion filed by supporters of Proposition 8 who claim that Judge Vaughn R. Walker
should have recused himself before ruling on the constitutionality of California's
marriage ban because he "secretly intends to marry his partner of 10 years and has thus
improperly placed himself in a position to reap personal benefit from his own ruling");
Lawrence Hurley, Justice Sotomayor Recusal Likely as Supreme Court Weighs
Greenhouse

Gas

"Nuisance"

Case,

N.Y.

Dec.

TIMES,

3,

2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/12/03/03greenwire-justice-sotomayor-recusallikely-as-supreme-cou-2319.html (suggesting that Sotomayor's possible recusal in
American Electric Power v. Connecticut could result in a 4-4 deadlock among the
remaining Justices); Jackie Calmes, Activism of Thomas's Wife Could Raise Judicial
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20l0/l0/
09/us/politics/09thomas.html; Tony Mauro, Behind Justice Stevens' Recusal in Florida
Case, THE

BLT:

THE

BLOG

OF

LEGAL

TIMES

(Dec.

4,

2009,

1:41

PM),

http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/12/behind-justice-stevens-recusal-in-floridacase.html (indicating that Justice Stevens may have recused himself in Stop the Beach
Renourishment Inc. v. FloridaDepartment of Environmental Protectionbecause Stevens
owns property "within a renourishment zone similar to the property at issue in the case").
21. Calmes, supra note 20, at Al.
22. Id.
23. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
24. See id
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organization that stood to benefit from the decision." 2 5 This potential
conflict notwithstanding, Justice Thomas may have had another reason to
recuse himself from that case.26
On January 19, 2011, Common Cause filed a petition with the
Department of Justice requesting an investigation into whether Justices
Thomas and Scalia should have recused themselves from the Citizens
United case under 28 U.S.C. § 455.27 In support of its request, Common
Cause contends that "both [J]ustices have participated in political
strategy sessions, perhaps while the [Citizens United] case was pending,
with corporate leaders whose political aims were advanced by the
decision." 2 8 According to Common Cause, Justices Scalia and Thomas
have each attended at least one secret political retreat sponsored by Koch
Industries, a conservative organization that has benefited significantly
from the Citizens United decision. 2 9 Yet, because of the Justices' failure
to list these attendances on their judicial disclosure forms and because of
the secrecy surrounding Koch Industries' gatherings, information about
these Justices' attendance at Koch retreats is not publically available. 30
The deliberate lack of transparency surrounding Justices Thomas and
Scalia's affiliation with the Koch brothers coupled with the Justices'
refusal to recuse in Citizens Unitedhas undermined the Court's image as
an impartial judiciary.31
Impartiality is a bedrock principle of justice, and judicial recusal is
critical to the Court's ability to remain impartial-or, at the very least, to
maintain the appearance of impartiality. Constitutional safeguards such
as life tenure and compensation illustrate the Framers' intention to
protect the federal judiciary from improper political and financial
influences. 32 Despite legislative attempts to create an objective and
25. Letter from Bob Edgar, President and CFO, Common Cause and Am H. Pearson,
Vice President for Programs, Common Cause to Eric Holder, Attorney General, United
States Dep't of Justice (Jan. 19, 2011) (on file with author).
26. See Eric Lichtblau, Advocacy Group Says Justices May Have Conflict in
Campaign Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 19, 2011); Common Cause Seeking Ethics
Probe of Scalia and Thomas, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Jan. 20, 2011, 1:50
PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/20 11/01/common-cause-seeking-ethics-probe-ofscalia-and-thomas.html.
27. Letter from Bob Edgar, supra note 25, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id at 2-3 ("The Koch Industries PAC spent $2.6 million in the 2010 election
cycle, and individuals associated with Koch Industries spent another $1.8 million.... In
addition, Americans for Prosperity-founded and funded by the Kochs-stated its
intention last summer to spend $45 million to influence the 2010 elections.").
30. Id. at 4.
31.

Id.

32. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1 (providing that Supreme Court Justices "shall hold
their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office").
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workable recusal policy, Supreme Court Justices remain reluctant to
recuse themselves, often citing the negative consequences of recusal on
The
the Court such as 4-4 deadlocks and procedural affirmances.
could
legislation
by
Leahy's
proposed
Justices
substitute
system of
alleviate some of these practical problems, 34 thereby assuaging the
Justices' reluctance to recuse themselves when their impartiality has
been questioned.
Section II will provide a historical summary of judicial recusal and
disqualification beginning with the common law origins of recusal. This
Section will also describe the circumstances surrounding the codification
of 28 U.S.C. § 455, the federal recusal statute, and its subsequent
amendments. Additionally, Section II will explore the evolution of
federal judicial recusal policy in the United States with an emphasis on
the Court's adherence to that policy-or lack thereof.
Section III will introduce the functional problems that arise from the
practice of judicial recusal, such as 4-4 deadlocks and procedural
affirmances, before presenting Leahy's proposal in Section IV. Section
IV will analyze the constitutionality of the legislation by addressing the
following three concerns: (1) whether Congress possesses the authority
to enact this legislation; (2) whether this legislation violates the
Appointments Clause of Article II; and (3) whether this legislation runs
Following the
counter to the doctrine of separation of powers.
constitutional analysis, this Comment will then assess the desirability of
Leahy's legislation.
Finally, Section V will examine other possible alternatives to
Leahy's proposed legislation. Ultimately, this Comment will conclude
by urging support for Leahy's proposal.
II.

3
HISTORY OF JUDICIAL RECUSAL & DISQUALIFICATION 1

The practice of judicial recusal is neither novel nor unique to the
The longstanding and
United States' system of jurisprudence.
widespread tradition of recusal, which dates back to medieval times,
36
evolved out of a desire for impartiality among judicial decision-makers.
In the United States, however, the federal law governing judicial recusal
policy strives not only to maintain actual impartiality but also to achieve
33. See infra Section III.
34. Id.
35. Frost, supra note 5, at 533 n.5 ("'Recusal' refers to a judge's voluntary decision
to remove himself from a case, while 'disqualification' refers to a statutory mandated
removal of a judge. However, the same standard governs recusal and disqualification
under federal law.").
36. Id. at 537 n.20 (citing Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1
(1923)).
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the appearance of impartiality.37 To attain these dual objectives, the
legislature has attempted to codify federal judicial recusal policy. 3 8
Despite Congress's repeated efforts to clearly define the circumstances
that warrant judicial recusal,39 vestiges of common law doctrines
disfavoring recusal continue to persist even at the highest level of the
contemporary American judicial system. 40 Traditionally, Supreme Court
Justices have construed legislative recusal standards narrowly. 4 1 This
tendency for Justices to sit rather than to recuse may be attributed to the
lack of a workable system for filling recusal-based vacancies on the
Supreme Court.42
A.

Common Law Origins ofJudicialRecusal Policy

The current statutory recusal policies in the United States reflect a
strong common law influence. According to English common law,
judicial impartiality was measured solely in terms of direct pecuniary
interest. 43 Consequently, recusal was justified only in circumstances
where adjudication implicated a judge's financial interest; neither bias
nor prejudice arising out of interpersonal relationships was recognized as
a legitimate reason for judicial recusal. 44 Although non-financial bases
for recusal have since been recognized and incorporated into
contemporary recusal standards, financial interest in a pending matter
remains the most likely reason for recusal among American judges.45
Two related doctrines regarding judicial recusal policy have
emerged from common law: the duty to sit4 6 and the rule of necessity. 47
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (requiring recusal when a judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned").
38. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 455 (defining federal judicial recusal policy).
39. See John Leubsdorf, Theories ofJudging and Judge Disqualification,62 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 237, 246 (1987) ("Congress has supplemented its original disqualification statute
of 1792 five times, in each instance expanding the scope of disqualification.").
40. See Bassett, supra note 15, at 682 ("[T]he Supreme Court's rationalization for its
insistence upon participating in cases involving potential recusal issues has been based on
a variant of the so-called 'rule of necessity' and the 'duty to sit."').
41. See Frost, supra note 5, at 536 ("[H]istory shows that each time the standard for
recusal is broadened by Congress, it is narrowed soon thereafter as members of the
judiciary apply it to themselves.").
42. 1 am asserting this tendency based not on the internal predilections of individual
Justices, but rather, on what I view as a systemic shortcoming.
43. Frost, supra note 5, at 539.
44.

Id

45. Bassett, supra note 15, at 655 ("Studies have shown that judges are most likely
to recuse themselves from cases involving an actual or suggested financial interest . ..
and are far less likely to recuse themselves from matters involving a possible nonfinancial bias.").
46. See Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965) (recognizing that judges have a "duty to sit"); Chief
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The duty to sit creates a presumption against recusal by requiring an
assigned judge "to hear a case unless and until an unambiguous
demonstration of extrajudicial bias or prejudice [is] made."4 8
Theoretically, judicial adherence to the duty to sit benefits the judicial
system by reducing intrusions on other judges and enhancing judicial
efficiency. Practically, however, this doctrine has resulted in repeated
instances of judges refusing to recuse themselves from cases when their
impartiality has been justifiably questioned.5 o Consequently, judicial
over-reliance on the duty to sit doctrine has reduced public confidence in
the United States' adjudicatory system.
Like the duty to sit, the rule of necessity requires judges to refrain
52
from recusal in situations that would otherwise warrant such action.
Unlike the duty to sit, however, the rule of necessity was intended to be
used only when no other judge was available.53 Although this doctrine
emerged over five hundred years ago,54 the Supreme Court has noted that
the rule of necessity should continue to serve the valuable purpose of

William's Ghost, supra note 13, at 814.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980) (concluding that 28
U.S.C. § 455 does not eliminate the rule of necessity); see also Bassett, supra note 15, at
682-83.
48. In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 968 (11th Cir. 2003) (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting); see also Chief William's Ghost, supra note 13, at 824-25 (distinguishing
between what he terms the "benign" duty to sit from the "pernicious" duty to sit).
According to Stempel, "the benign notion of the duty to sit [is understood] as cautioning
against recusal simply to avoid a difficult, time-consuming, or politically charged case,"
whereas the "pernicious" connotation of the duty to sit is understood as "resisting recusal
unless the facts of the case force the judge to step aside." Id at 825.
49. Bassett, supra note 15, at 682-83 (2005) (quoting Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist,
Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 604 (1987)).
50. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.);
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2002) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.).
51. See Bill Mears, Scalia Won't Recuse Himselffrom Cheney Case, CNN JUSTICE,
(Mar. 18, 2004) http://articles.cnn.com/2004-03-18/justice/scalia.recusal1 cheney-caserecuse-scalia-and-cheney?_s=PM:LAW (quoting Senator Leahy as saying, "Instead of
strengthening public confidence in our court system, Justice Scalia's decision risks
undermining it").
52. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. at 213 ("[A]lthough a judge had better not, if
it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest,
yet he not only may but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise.") (emphasis
added).
53. See id. at 213-214 (1980); Bassett, supra note 15, at 676 (defining the "rule of
necessity" as "a common law doctrine permitting a judge with an otherwise disqualifying
conflict of interest to hear the case if all other judges are similarly disqualified"); Jeffrey
T. Fiut, Comment, Recusal and Recompense: Amending New York Recusal Law in Light
of the JudicialPay Raise Controversy, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 1597, 1637 (2009) (explaining
that under the "rule of necessity" doctrine, "[a] judge can sit in a case in which she is
interested if there is no other judge available").
54. Bassett, supra note 15, at 682-83.

260

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:1

providing litigants with a forum for litigation.
Although there are technical differences between the duty to sit and
the rule of necessity, both of these doctrines tend to prevent judicial
recusal in situations that would otherwise warrant such action.56
Consequently, many contemporary judges have continued to invoke
these common law principles when justifying nonrecusal." In 1974,
Congress attempted to limit judicial reliance on the duty to sit by
amending 28 U.S.C. § 455.58 Although the First Circuit recognized these
amendments as abolishing the duty to sit doctrine,59 many of its fellow
circuit courts did not. 6 0 Moreover, the 1974 amendments failed to
eliminate the rule of necessity, 6 1 which, according to the Model Rules of
Judicial Conduct, may "override the rule of disqualification." 62 Thus,
despite legislative attempts to limit use of these common law doctrines,
the influence of these principles has continued to prevail.
B.

Evolution ofJudicialRecusal Policy in the United States
Although the first federal judicial recusal policy in the United States

55. See Will, 449 U.S. at 217 ("[W]ithout the Rule [of necessity], some litigants
would be denied their right to a forum.").
56. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837-39 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.)
(relying on duty to sit doctrine in denial of respondents' motion to disqualify); Will, 449
U.S. at 214 (citing cases in support of the proposition that "the Rule of Necessity has
been consistently applied in this country in both state and federal courts").
57. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.);
Laird,409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.) (relying on duty to sit doctrine in denial
of respondents' motion to disqualify).
58. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 6351, 6355
(explaining that the language of the amendment "has the effect of removing the so-called
'duty to sit' which has become a gloss on the existing statute"); see Roberts v. Bailar, 625
F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980).
59. See Waller v. U.S., 504 U.S. 962, 964 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (advocating
grant of certiorari to resolve conflict among the circuits in interpreting statutory recusal
provisions where First circuit has concluded that "the language of [28 U.S.C.]
§ 455(a) .. . did away with the 'duty to sit' doctrine" while other Circuit courts adhere to
a contrary approach).
60. Id. (indicating that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
continued to apply the duty to sit in cases not involving an extrajudicial source of bias).
61. Will, 449 U.S. at 217 (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 455 does not eliminate the
rule of necessity).
62.

MODEL RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11, cmt. 3 (2007). The Rules provide:

The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a
judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary
statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate
judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining
order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the
record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to
transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable.
Id.
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was codified in 1792, this initial standard applied only to district court
judges.6 3 Over 150 years later, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 455, a
recusal standard applicable to all federal judges-district judges, circuit
judges, and United States Supreme Court Justices.64 Although § 455 has
been modified multiple times since its enactment in 1948,5 this statute
nonetheless remains the governing legal standard for federal judicial
recusal in the United States.66
Initially, § 455 created an expectation for sua sponte recusals when
a judge's interest in a matter or connection to any party would "render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other
proceeding therein."
Critical of § 455's subjective recusal standard,68
which established the judge as the arbiter of personal bias or prejudice,
the American Bar Association ("ABA") introduced a new standard for
recusal in its 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("Model Code"). 69
The ABA's 1972 Model Code provided that "a judge should disqualify
himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." 70 Unlike the standard set forth in the original version of
§ 455, whereby judicial impartiality was to be determined based on a
judge's self-assessment, the standard advanced by the 1972 Model Code
called for an objective assessment of impartiality from the perspective of
a reasonable, disinterested person.n
In 1974, Congress amended § 455 by replacing the statute's

63. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278-79 (1792). That statute provided:
And be it further enacted, that in all suits and actions in any district court of the
United States, in which it shall appear that the judge of such court is, any ways,
concerned in interest, or has been of counsel for either party, it shall be the duty
of such judge on application of either party, to cause the fact to be entered on
the minutes of the court, and also to order an authenticated copy thereof, with
all the proceedings in such suit or action, to be forthwith certified to the next
circuit court of the district, which circuit court shall, thereupon, take
cognizance thereof, in the like manner, as if it had been originally commenced
in that court, and shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly.
Id.
64.
65.

28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
See Leubsdorf, supra note 39, at 682.

66.

28 U.S.C.

§ 455.

67. Fiut, supra note 53, at 1603.
68. Id. (defining subjective recusal standard as "[a] standard that allows a judge to
use her discretion and look to her own conscience to determine whether she is biased").
69. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351 (1974) (detailing
the creation of the Model Code, which was unanimously approved by the ABA's House
of Delegates to replace the Canons of Judicial Ethics).
70. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(C)(1) (1972); see also Fiut,supra note 53,
at 1604.
71. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(C)(1) (1972); see also Fiut,supra note 53,
at 1604-05.
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subjective recusal standard with the Model Code's objective approach.72
Additionally, Congress adopted the Model Code's "appearance-of-bias"
standard, thereby requiring recusal for both actual and perceived
impartiality.7 3 Furthermore, the amended statute mandated recusal in
specifically-enumerated circumstances, regardless of a judge's
impartiality.74
The 1974 amendments were triggered in part by then-Associate
Justice William Rehnquist's controversial refusal to recuse in Laird v.
Tatum,75 after which § 455 became the subject of increased public
scrutiny.76 In Laird, respondents moved for Justice Rehnquist to
disqualify himself from the proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.
Prior to joining the Court, Justice Rehnquist had testified as an expert
witness before the Senate on behalf of the Department of Justice.78 Both
in his testimony before the Senate and on other occasions prior to joining
the Court, Justice Rehnquist had expressed views contrary to the position
advanced by the respondents in Laird regarding executive authority
relating to government surveillance.79 The respondents cited these
instances in support of their contention that Justice Rehnquist's
impartiality in this matter was "clearly questionable."so
In addition to denying respondents' motion, Justice Rehnquist
issued a memorandum explaining his refusal to recuse 8 ' Applying
§ 455's subjective recusal standard to himself, Justice Rehnquist simply
concluded that he was not biased and, subsequently, that § 455 did not
warrant his disqualification in the matter.82 He then invoked the
72. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (providing that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might be reasonably questioned"); see also Fiut, supra note 50, at 1606.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (requiring recusal where a judge's "impartiality might be
reasonably questioned" and where a judge actually "has personal bias or prejudice").
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (requiring disqualification in specifically-enumerated
circumstances such as where, for example, a judge "has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding," § 455(b)(1), or where a judge, in private practice, "served as lawyer in the
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been
a material witness concerning it," § 455(b)(2)).
75. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972)
(Rehnquist, 3., mem.) (explaining his refusal to recuse).
76. Fiut, supra note 53, at 1603 ("Rehnquist's failure to recuse himself in Laird and
the fact that he cast the deciding vote in that controversial case helped persuade Congress
to broaden § 455 and codify parts of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct.").
77. See Laird, 409 U.S. at 825 (Rehnquist, J., mem.).
78. Id. at 824-25.
79. Id. at 826.
80. Id. at 825.
81. Id. at 824.
82. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 (Rehnquist, J., mem.).
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common law doctrines of the duty to sit and the rule of necessity83 in
further support of his decision not to recuse. 84
Justice Rehnquist described the duty to sit as "even stronger" for
members of the Supreme Court than for judges on other courts because
of the unique consequences that may arise when a Supreme Court Justice
is disqualified.8 5 As Justice Rehnquist aptly noted, the absence of even
one of the nine Justices increases the possibility of an equally divided
Court. 86 Rather than definitively resolving the legal issue in question and
announcing a clear legal rule,87 an equally divided Supreme Court merely
affirms the lower court's decision, thus leaving the state of law
unsettled. 8
After refusing to recuse himself in Laird, Justice Rehnquist then
sided with the five-Justice majority, effectively casting the deciding vote
in that case.88 Although Justice Rehnquist's participation did not violate
the then-existing legal standard for recusal under § 455, his actions have
been criticized as "lack[ing] the appearance of impartiality necessary to
maintain public confidence in the Supreme Court." 90 As such, his
conduct contravened the principles set forth in the Model Code. 9'
The controversy surrounding Justice Rehnquist's participation in
Laird illustrates the conflict that existed between the narrow statutory
requirements of § 455 prior to the 1974 amendments and the broad
83. Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, supra note 10, at 605 ("Although Rehnquist's
Tatum memorandum spoke only of the duty to sit, it invoked portions of the rule of
necessity by characterizing the ground for his disqualification as mere aversion to his
judicial philosophy, thus implying that his recusal in Tatum would subject all judges with
views on legal issues to disqualification.").
84. Laird, 409 U.S. at 837 (Rehnquist, J., mem.).
85. Id. at 837-38.
86. Id.
87. Although 5-4 decisions may avoid procedural affirmance of a lower court's
decision, a majority decision does not guarantee that the decision provides clear legal
guidance. See Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/
18rulings.html (commenting on the declining level of clarity in Roberts Court decisions).
Recent studies have shown that the Roberts Court's decisions lack clarity, a characteristic
often attributed to the Court's desire to achieve unanimity. Id. Even Justice Scalia has
commented that his brethren's opinions tend to be "opaque," and one federal appellate
judge described a recent opinion as "almost aggressively unhelpful." Id.
88. Laird,409 U.S. at 837-38 (Rehnquist, J., mem.); see infra Section III (discussing
functional problems arising from Supreme Court Justices' refusal to recuse).
89. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that plaintiff-respondents failed to
raise a justiciable controversy); see Fiut, supra note 50, at 1604.
90. Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participatein Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM.
L. REv. 106, 124 (1973).
91. Id. at 111 (noting that although the Model Code, 28 U.S.C. § 144, and § 7 of the
Administrative Procedure Act are not binding on Supreme Court Justices, these
provisions nonetheless offer guidance in determining the propriety of a Justice's
participation in a case).
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ethical principles promulgated by the ABA.9 2 In an effort to resolve this
tension between the statutory and ethical standards for recusal, Congress
amended § 455 in 1974 to make these dual standards "virtually
identical." 93
Despite Congress's efforts in amending § 455, the Supreme Court
has attempted to evade the federal recusal standard. In 1993, the Court
issued its Statement of Recusal Policy (Statement) in an effort to
articulate the Justices' recusal obligations in cases involving their
relatives. 94 Specifically, the Statement addressed circumstances in which
matters appearing before the Court involved individuals within the
specified degrees of relation to a Justice such that recusal would be
warranted under § 455(b)(5)(ii).95 However, as the Statement pointed
out, the statutory language of § 455(b)(5)(ii) specifies that recusal is
warranted only when the relative "[ils acting as a lawyer in the
proceeding." 96 The statute's use of a present tense verb implies that a
relative's involvement at a previous stage of litigation is not sufficient to
warrant recusal under the statute.97
The Statement also noted that § 455(a)'s standard for recusal is
"less specific" than that of § 455(b)(5)(ii)." Accordingly, a relative's
connection to either a firm or a case does not automatically give rise to a
scenario in which the Justice's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" such that recusal would be required pursuant to § 455(a).99
Thus, despite the legislature's intent to abolish the duty to sit, the
Statement reflected the Court's continued reliance on this concept.
Explaining its reluctance to recuse absent "some special factor," 00 the
Court emphasized its unique nature' 0 ' as justifying a less demanding
92. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453 (1974) reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352 ("The
existence of dual standards, statutory and ethical, . . . has had the effect of forcing a judge
to decide either the legal issue or the ethical issue at his peril.").
93. Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participatein Laird v. Tatum, supra note 90, at
111.
94. Statement of Recusal Policy, Supreme Court Release, (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Statement of Recusal Policy].
95. Id
96. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(ii) (2006).
97. Statement of RecusalPolicy, supra note 94.
98. Id.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
100. Statement of Recusal Policy,supra note 94.
101. Id. (describing how the Court's unique nature is affected by recusal). The
Statement provides:
In this Court, where the absence of one Justice cannot be made up by another,
needless recusal deprives litigants of the nine Justices to which they are
entitled, produces the possibility of an even division on the merits of the case,
and has a distorting effect upon the certiorari process, requiring the petitioner to
obtain (under our current practice) four votes out of eight instead of four out of
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recusal standard for itself compared to the federal standard codified in §
455.102

More recently, however, in 2004, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
commented that "each of [the Justices on the Court] strives to abide by
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455."103 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
assurance of compliance notwithstanding, the recusal practices of certain
Justices in recent years illustrate a continued refusal to recuse.104
Perhaps the Justices would be less hesitant to recuse if a viable system of
substitution were to exist such as that proposed by Senator Leahy.
III. FUNCTIONAL PROBLEMS THAT ARISE FROM JUDICIAL RECUSAL

In Laird, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that no system of
substitution exists to fill recusal-based vacancies on the Court. 05
Consequently, he explained, "the disqualification of one Justice ...
raises the possibility of an affirmance of the judgment below by an
equally divided Court."106 In instances of 4-4 deadlocks, automatic
procedural affirmance of the lower court's decision leaves the state of the
law unsettled, which may be especially problematic when the Court has
granted certiorari to resolve jurisdictional conflicts.107
Significantly, the difficulties surrounding Supreme Court recusal
practices, as articulated nearly four decades ago by Justice Rehnquist in
Laird, continue to persist. There is still no system for "substituting
Justices" on the Supreme Court in the same way that lower federal
judges may serve as proxies for one another in instances of
disqualification.'0 o Because of the lack of such a system of substitution,
Supreme Court recusals continue to pose the risk of procedural
affirmances by an equally divided Court."' 9 Furthermore, as Justice
nine.
Id.
102. Bassett, supra note 15, at 681 (explaining that "the Supreme Court has made it
clear that it has no intention of following the strict proscriptions of section 455, and
instead believes that the Court's unique nature justifies a less demanding standard").
103. Letter from William Rehnquist, Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court to
Patrick Leahy, United States Senator (Jan. 26, 2004) (on file with author).
104. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 926-27 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
mem.) (denying motion to recuse and noting that, in his opinion, his recusal would "harm
the Court"); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301-03 (2002) (statement
of Rehnquist, C.J.) (declining to recuse himself and explaining, in support of his decision,
"the negative impact that the unnecessary disqualification of even one Justice may have
upon our Court").
105. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. at 837 (Rehnquist, J., mem.).
106. Id. at 837-38.
107. See Laird,409 U.S. at 837.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (per curium);
Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (per curium); Dow Chem. Co. v.
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Rehnquist noted, no higher appellate court exists to review an equally
divided Court's decision, thus leaving the legal issue in question
unresolved."o Moreover, when a case is heard by less than the full
Court, the absence of one Justice may enhance the effect of the biases
among the sitting Justices."i
Another problem implicated by Supreme Court recusals involves
losing a potential grant of certiorari.12 According to Supreme Court
tradition, the grant of certiorari requires four affirmative votes."13
Recusal-based abstentions may deprive the petitioner of a potentially
affirmative vote, which may thereby prevent the grant of certiorari. 14 As
Justice Scalia explained in one of his self-issued"' denials of a recusal
motion: "The petitioner needs five votes to overturn the judgment
below, and it makes no difference whether the needed fifth vote is
missing because it has been cast for the other side, or because it has not
been cast at all.""16 Thus, a recusal-based abstention is, in effect,
"indistinguishable" from a vote against the grant of certiorari. 117
Professor Steven Lubet has explored the paradox of what he calls
the "certiorari conundrum," which occurs when a Justice's recusal-based
abstention "harms the very party it was intended to protect."" 8
According to Lubet's statistical analysis, the absence of even one Justice
"always reduces the already-slight likelihood of obtaining certiorari."'1 9
Thus, in some circumstances, as Lubet illustrates, judicial recusal for the
Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curium).
110. Id. at 837-38.
Ill . F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court,
41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 674 n.143 (2009) ("[S]hared biases may actually enhance the
strength of a bias through group polarization, especially if no other Justice holds a
strongly opposing view.").
112. Bassett, supra note 15, at 686.
113. Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari
Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REv. 657, 662 n.26 (1996) (explaining that the four vote
requirement is rooted solely in tradition and is not imposed by statute).
114. Id. at 663.
115. Fiut, supra note 53, at 1637 (commenting that the practice of "a judge rul[ing] on
her own recusal has become 'one of the most heavily criticized features of United States
disqualification law").
116. Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (denying motion
to recuse).
117. Lubet, supra note 113, at 662.
118. Id.at661.
119. Id. at 658, 663. Lubet provides the following illustration:
[A]ssume a 0.1 probability that any Justice will vote to grant certiorari in any
case, and that three already have decided to grant a certain petition. If six
Justices are yet to vote, the probability of granting certiorari is .47. With only
five remaining Justices, however, the probability of review drops to .41, a
difference of .06. This relationship remains constant, although ratios change,
for all probabilities less than 1.0.
Id
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purpose of avoiding the appearance of prejudice against the petitioner
may result in actual harm to the petitioner (i.e., the denial of certiorari),
the party for whom the recusal was intended to protect. 12 0
IV. SENATOR LEAHY'S PROPOSAL

In an attempt to remedy some of the problems stemming from the
current judicial recusal policy, Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy has
proposed a bill that would allow retired Supreme Court Justices to sit in
place of recused Justices. Specifically, this legislation would "authorize
the designation and assignment of retired justices . . . to particular cases
in which an active justice is recused."l 2 1 The bill, which was introduced
on September 29, 2010, would amend chapter 13 of title 28,122 the statute
governing the designation and assignment of retired Supreme Court
Justices to active duty. 123
Currently, any retired Supreme Court Justice is permitted to
"perform such judicial duties in any circuit, including those of a circuit
justice, as he is willing to undertake."' 24 The text of 28 U.S.C. § 294(d)
explicitly precludes designation or assignment to the Supreme Court.1 25
Leahy has publically expressed dissatisfaction with the existing statute,
which he believes creates an "ironic"l26 situation whereby "[r]etired
Justices may be designated to sit on any court in the land except the one
to which they were confirmed."l27
Leahy's proposed amendment seeks to resolve this purported irony
by extending statutory permission to any willing retired Justice "to serve
as a justice on the Supreme Court of the United States."l 28 For a retired
Justice to be designated or assigned to the Supreme Court, Leahy's
proposal requires: (1) that "an active justice is recused from that case"' 29

120. Id. at 661-62.
121. S. 3781, 111th Cong. (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29, 2010).
122. Id.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 294(a).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 294(a) states in full: "Any retired Chief Justice of the United States
or Associate Justice of the Supreme Court may be designated and assigned by the Chief
Justice of the United States to perform such judicial duties in any circuit, including those
of a circuit justice, as he is willing to undertake."
125. Id. § 294(d) ("No such designation or assignment shall be made to the Supreme
Court.").
126. David Ingram, Leahy Introduces Bill to Allow Retired Justices to Serve, THE
BLT:

THE

BLOG

OF

LEGAL

TIMES

(Sept.

29,

2010,

3:25

PM),

http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/09/leahy-introduces-bill-to-allow-retired-justicesto-serve.html.
127. Id.
128. S. 3781, 111th Cong. § 1 (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29,
2010).
129. Id.
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and (2) that "a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign
that retired Chief or Associate Justice."l 30 Except as provided by the
proposed amendments to this section, 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) would continue
to prohibit designation or assignment to the Supreme Court.1 3 1
A.

Constitutionalityof Senator Leahy's Proposal

Leahy's proposal raises three major constitutional concerns:
(1) whether Congress possesses the authority to enact this legislation;
(2) whether this legislation violates the Appointments Clause of Article
II; and (3) whether this legislation runs counter to the doctrine of
separation of powers. Although Duke University Law Professor Paul
Carrington has suggested that Leahy's proposal will likely pass
constitutional muster, 13 2 careful analysis of the proposed legislation is
necessary to ensure its constitutionality.
1.

Congressional Authority

Congress derives its authority from Article I of the Constitution,
which permits Congressional action only if such action is expressly or
In McCulloch v.
impliedly authorized in the Constitution. 133
Maryland,13 4 the Supreme Court broadly construed Congress's power,
thereby authorizing Congress to carry out its lawful authority through
any means not prohibited by the Constitution. 135 Accordingly, Leahy's
legislative proposal likely falls within the scope of Congress's
constitutional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.1 36 Yet,
even if Congress possesses the power to pass Leahy's proposal, the law
37
itself must not violate any constitutional precepts or principles.

130. Id.
131. Id. (proposing the following language: "Except as provided under subsection
(a)(2), no designation or assignment under this section shall be made to the Supreme
Court.").
132. Should RetiredJustices Be CalledBack to the Supreme Court?, supra note 1.
133. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
134. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
135. Interestingly, as Stempel points out, "Chief Justice John Marshall arguably
violated even the most narrow disqualification norms of his time by acting as a judge in
his own case, albeit one in which his involvement was personal and ideological rather
than financial." Chief William's Ghost, supra note 13, 837-38.
136. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution"); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
137. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 423 (asserting the Court's "painful duty" to
strike down unconstitutional legislation).
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Appointments Clause

On its face, the text of this legislation necessarily implicates the
Appointments Clause of Article I1.138 The mechanism for selecting a
substitute Justice under Leahy's proposal, which allows the active
Justices to select the recused Justice's replacement," 9 may infringe upon
the President and the Senate's constitutionally-defined roles in the
judicial appointment process. 14 0 Yet, because all potential substitutes are
retired Justices, they have already been nominated and confirmed
pursuant to the appointment process of Article 11.141 Furthermore, if the
substitute Justices are considered inferior officers rather than principal
officers,142 then Congress may lawfully vest the appointment power of
such officers to the Supreme Court.14 3 Thus, the first inquiry is whether
a retired Supreme Court Justice who is filling a recusal-based vacancy is
a principal officer or an inferior officer. 144
Although the Supreme Court has failed to explicitly define either
principal officer or inferior officer,14 5 the Court's limited Appointments
Clause jurisprudence provides some guidance for distinguishing these
two types of officers. Historically, the Court has examined the officer's
138. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides:
The President ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint .. . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id. at cl. 1-2. Section 2 further provides: "The President shall have Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session." Id. at cl. 3.
139. See S. 3781, 111th Cong. § I (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29,
2010) (requiring that "a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that
retired Chief or Associate Justice").
140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
141. Id.
142. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988) (explaining that "the Constitution
for purposes of appointment . .. divides all its officers into two classes" (internal citations
omitted)).
143. Id (comparing the appointment process of principal officers, who are "selected
by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate," with that of inferior officers,
who "Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of
departments, or by the Judiciary") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)).
144. Id. at 670-71 (1988) (noting that "[t]he initial question is, accordingly, whether
appellant is an 'inferior' or a 'principal' officer").
145. United States v. Edmond, 520 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1997) (noting that "Morrison
did not purport to set forth a definitive test for whether an office is 'inferior' under the
Appointments Clause. To the contrary, it explicitly stated: 'We need not attempt here to
decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers, because in our view
[the independent counsel] clearly falls on the 'inferior officer' side of that line."') (citing
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 671).
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status or rank vis-i-vis a superior,1 4 6 the extent of the officer's duties, the
duration of the officer's service, and the circumstances under which the
officer has been appointed. 14 7 If an officer is subordinate to or subject to
removal by a superior, has limited duties or jurisdiction, has limited
tenure, and is appointed under special or unique circumstances, the Court
will likely conclude that such an officer is inferior. 14 8 Accordingly,
Congress may lawfully vest the authority for appointing such an officer
within the purview of the Court.14 9
After weighing these factors in United States v. Eaton,150 the Court
determined that a "vice consul" appointed by the executive during the
consul's temporary absence was properly categorized as an inferior
officer because he was "charged with the performance of the duty of [a]
superior for a limited time[,] and under special and temporary
conditions.""' Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson,15 2 the Court concluded
that a specially-appointed independent counsell 5 3 was an inferior officer
because she was subject to removal by a higher-ranking executive branch
official (in this case the Attorney General),15 4 she was empowered to
146. Id. at 662-63. In Edmond, the Court further explains:
Generally speaking, the term 'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with
some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an
'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that
other officers may be identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or
possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude. If that were the intention,
the Constitution might have used the phrase "lesser officer." Rather, in the
context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to
important Government assignments, we think it evident that 'inferior officers'
are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who
were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
Id.
147. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672 (asserting that "factors relating to the 'ideas of tenure,
duration ... and duties' . . . are sufficient to establish that appellant is an 'inferior' officer
in the constitutional sense").
148. See id.
149. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
150. United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331 (1898).
151. Id. at 343.
152. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
153. The statute at issue in Morrison, Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of
1987, provided for the appointment of an independent counsel by the Special Division, a
court consisting of three circuit court judges, one of whom must be a judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and no two of whom were to
be from the same court. Id. at 661 n.3. Pursuant to this statute, the role of independent
counsel was to "investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking
Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws." Id. at 660.
154. Id. at 671 (noting that although "appellant may not be 'subordinate' to the
Attorney General (and the President) insofar as she possesses a degree of independent
discretion to exercise the powers delegated to her under the Act, the fact that she can be
removed by the Attorney General indicates that she is to some degree 'inferior' in rank

201l]1

A SECOND SITTING

271

perform only limited duties,155 her office was limited in jurisdiction,'s
and her tenure was limited."s7
The language of Article II explicitly references "Judges of the
[S]upreme Court," thus seemingly conferring principal status upon the
However, the substitute Justices created by Leahy's
Justices.'
legislation may be appropriately categorized as inferior officers because
of the brevity and infrequency of their role in the overall functioning of
the Court and because of their limited involvement in specific, discrete
matters.159
According to Leahy's proposal, a substitute Justice would be called
upon only when an active Justice is disqualified,16 0 thus limiting the
substitute's jurisdiction and tenure to the scope and duration of the
particular matter for which substitution is requested. Similar to the vice
consul in Eaton, a substitute Justice under Leahy's proposal would be
"charged with the performance of the duty of the superior for a limited
time, and under special and temporary conditions. . . ."16 1 Thus, as in
Eaton, the mere performance of a principal officer's duties in a limited
and temporary capacity would not thereby "transform" the substitute
Justice into "the superior and permanent official." 62 Yet, a recused
Justice would still maintain the status of a superior officer within the
meaning of the Constitution (i.e., principal officer) in the same way that
the consul in Eaton remained a superior officer during his temporary
63
absence, despite the appointment of a vice-consul.1
A substitute Justice's decision-making authority, however, should
not be considered subordinate to that of an active Justice. Although the
Edmond Court suggested that a relationship of this nature is a requisite
component of the superior-inferior officer dynamic,' 64 such a relationship
and authority").
155. Id. ("An independent counsel's role is restricted primarily to investigation and, if
appropriate, prosecution for certain federal crimes.").
156. Id. at 672 ("[A]n independent counsel can only act within the scope of the
jurisdiction that has been granted by the Special Division pursuant to a request by the
Attorney General.").
157. Morison, 487 U.S. at 672. ("[T]he office of independent counsel is "temporary"
in the sense that an independent counsel is appointed essentially to accomplish a single
task, and when that task is over the office is terminated, either by the counsel herself or
by action of the Special Division.").
158. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2.
159. S. 3781, 11 Ith Cong. (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29, 2010).
160. Id.
161. United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. U.S. 331 (1898).
162. Id.
163. The language of Article 11 explicitly references "Consuls" and "Judges of the
supreme Court," thus conferring principle status upon them. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
164. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. at 663 (defining inferior officers as "officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by

272

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:1

in the context of the composition of the Supreme Court would frustrate
the purpose of Leahy's legislation by denying the substitute Justices the
very decision-making authority with which these proxies have been
vested.
Furthermore, the substitute Justices should not be considered
"subordinate" to the active members of the Court because, like the
independent counsel in Morrison, the substitutes have independent
discretion with which to carry out their responsibilities. 16 5 While serving
as proxies, the substitute Justices should be considered equal to the active
Justices with regard to their decision-making authority and the respect
that these Justices warrant. Yet, the substitute Justices will remain
inferior to the current members of the Court in terms of "rank and
authority,"' 6 6 and, like the independent counsel in Morrison, are thus
properly categorized as inferior officers.
In contrast to the independent counsel in Morrison who was
considered inferior in "rank and authority" because she was subject to
removal by the Attorney General,' 67 the substitute Justices are not subject
to removal by any individual active Justice.168 In fact, Leahy's proposal
is silent as to any removal process for the substitutes.16 9 However, the
substitute Justices may be viewed as inferior in "rank and authority" to
the active Justices collectively because a majority of active Justices
controls which proxy is selected.170
Moreover, the substitute Justices are inferior to the active Justices in
"rank and authority" because, ultimately, the substitutes are still retired,
even if they occasionally sit as proxies; thus, they have less overall
influence in the aggregate of the current Court's decisions. In light of the
Morrison Court's reasoning, perhaps a more nuanced assessment of this
relationship is that the substitute Justices are inferior only when
considering the Court as a whole but not to any individual active Justice.
Thus, the active Justices, both sitting and recused, collectively possess a
higher degree of "rank and authority" compared to the retired Justices,
even when a retired Justice serves as a proxy.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the policy of allowing the active

Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate").
165. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988).
166. Id
167. Id. (explaining that "the fact that she can be removed by the Attorney General
indicates that she is to some degree 'inferior' in rank and authority").
168. See S. 3781, 111th Cong. (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29,
2010).
169. Id.
170. Id. (providing that "a majority of active justices vote to designate or assign" the
substitute Justice).
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Justices to vote' 71 on which retired Justice will act as a proxy in a given
case would not violate the Appointments Clause because the Judiciary
has the power, pursuant to the Constitution, to appoint inferior
officers. 172 Due to the increasing frequency of recusals,' 73 however,
these substitute Justices may arguably assume more than a sporadic role
on the Court.
The regularity with which retired Justices may have the opportunity
to reappear as voting members of the Court may worry some opponents
of Leahy's plan. 174 Yet, even regular substitution of a retired Justice
would not transform the substitute into a principal officer' 75 because a
substitute is not charged with assuming the full range of duties of an
Thus, Leahy's legislation does not violate the
active Justice.
Appointments Clause by depriving the President and the Senate of their
constitutionally-required roles because the substitute Justices that are
selected by the Court are not principal officers.
Moreover, Leahy's proposal merely enables the Justices to
"designate and assign" the substitute Justices, not to "appoint" them.17 6
In fact, Leahy's proposal is void of any variant of the word "appoint."' 7 7
Leahy seems to be skirting the Appointments Clause issue simply by
avoiding any language of appointment in his carefully crafted statutory
proposal, a tactic that the Court has accepted in the past.178 Similar to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice at issue in Edmond, from which the
word "appointment" was also "conspicuously absent,"' 79 Leahy's
171. Id.
172. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
173. Justice Elena Kagan has already recused herself from nearly half of the cases
that the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear this term. See Editorial, Recusals and the
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/
opinion/08fri l.html (calculating Kagan's expected recusal rate as 25 out of 51 cases); see
also Bill Mears, New Supreme Court Term Begins: Kagan to Recuse from Dozens of
Cases, (Oct. 4, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-04/politics/scotus.new.term 1
(estimating
military-funerals-westboro-baptist-church-fred-phelps?_s=PM:POLITICS
that Kagan will recuse herself from at least 24 of the of the 52 cases on the Court's
docket).
174. Robert Barnes, A Deep Bench of Substitute Justices Goes Unused, WASH. POST,
Aug. 9, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/08/08/AR2010080802629.html (postulating that because the current pool of
retirees, including Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, are all "to the left of the
IC]ourt's dominant conservatives," many conservatives may oppose Leahy's proposal.
As Hofsta Professor of Law James Sample stated, "It's so difficult to divorce discussion
of the proposal from the individual [J]ustices who might end up replacing the recused
[Jiustices.").
175. United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898).
176. S.3781.
177. Id.
178. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 657 (1997).
179. Id.
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proposal uses the language of "assignment" rather than "appointment."
As noted by the Edmond Court, "[t]he difference between the power to
'assign' officers to a particular task and the power to 'appoint' those
officers is not merely stylistic." 180
Statutory language of appointment invokes the Appointments
Clause. Accordingly, a statute including language of appointment must
be in conformity with the constitutional requirements set forth in Article
II. Language of assignment, however, does not require the same degree
of constitutional analysis as that of appointment.18 1 A statutory scheme
through which previously-appointed officers are assigned rather than
appointed does not necessitate an Appointments Clause analysis.
In Weiss v. United States,182 for instance, the Court upheld a statute
that enabled previously-appointed military officers to be assigned as
military judges.183 Like the officers in Weiss, retired Supreme Court
Justices have been properly appointed pursuant to the Appointments
Clause of Article II. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute at
issue in Weiss, the Court relied heavily on the military officers' prior
appointment, noting that "allowing civilians to be assigned to Courts of
Military Review, without being appointed pursuant to the Appointments
Clause, obviously presents a quite different question."l 84 Similarly,
because Leahy's proposal merely enables the assignment of previouslyappointed officers, this legislation does not violate the Appointments
Clause.
3.

Separation of Powers

The final inquiry with regard to the constitutionality of Leahy's
legislation is whether this proposal violates the separation of powers
principles that undergird the Constitution.185 These principles reflect the
Framer's desire to avoid the concentration of power in a single
governmental authority1 86 and thereby prevent the threat of tyranny. 87

180. Id.
181. Id. at 657-58 (citing Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 172 (1994)
("Congress repeatedly and consistently distinguished between an office that would
require a separate appointment and a position or duty to which one could be 'assigned' or
'detailed' by a superior officer.")).
182. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994).
183. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 176.
184. Id. 510 U.S. at 170 n.4. The Weiss Court also cited the military officers' active
duty status in addition to the officers' prior appointment as an additional justification for
upholding the statute. Id. at 170.
185. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 697-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The principle of
separation of powers is expressed in our Constitution in the first section of each of the
first three Articles.").
186. Id. 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The allocation of power among Congress, the
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Thus, the Framers established a tripartite system of government
consisting of three distinct branches of government-the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial--each of which is simultaneously subordinate
and superior to the others. 88
Using the separation of powers doctrine as their framework, the
Framers effectuated an enduring system of checks and balances by
vesting limited and overlapping authority in three separate governmental
Pursuant to the parameters defined in the
subdivisions.' 89
Constitution,19 0 each branch serves a unique governmental function, and
no branch may encroach upon the province of another.'91 This constant
tension between the legislative, executive, and the judicial branches of
government has helped to preserve the structure of United States
government.
Because separation of powers principles continue to remain the
bedrock of contemporary United States government,192 Leahy's
legislation raises critical separation of powers concerns. Assessing
whether Leahy's proposed system disrupts the balance of governmental
power involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the process of assigning and

President, and the courts in such fashion as to preserve the equilibrium the Constitution
sought to establish-so that 'a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department,' Federalist No. 51, p. 321 (J. Madison), can effectively be resisted.").
187. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas,
J., concurring) ("The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The
purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy." (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 293 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
188. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The
fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of
government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of
either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question.").
189. United State v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) ("Madison recognized that
our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping
responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence. . . ."); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.") (internal quotation marks omitted)).
190. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629-630, ("So much is implied in the very
fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitution. . . .").
191. Id at 630 ("James Wilson, one of the framers of the Constitution and a former
justice of this court, said that the independence of each department required that its
proceedings 'should be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of either of the
other two powers."').
192. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Without a secure
structure of separated powers, our Bill of Rights would be worthless. . . .").
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designating substitute Justices is an exercise of purely executive or
legislative power and (2) whether the proposed legislation deprives the
either the executive or legislative branch of exclusive control over the
exercise of a constitutionally-vested power.'9 3 Because neither inquiry
yields an affirmative response, 19 4 Leahy's legislation does not violate the
principles of separation of powers.
Justice Scalia applied this dual inquiry in his dissenting opinion in
Morrison.195 He concluded that the Ethics in Government Act violated
separation of powers principles because (1) the statute authorized the
special prosecutor to engage in the exercise of purely executive power
and (2) the special prosecutor's authority encroached upon the
President's exclusive control over the exercise of his constitutionallyvested power.' 96 In contrast to Scalia's assessment of the power to
prosecute at issue in Morrison,' the power to assign and designate is
not a power exclusively vested in another branch.198 Although the power
to assign and designate is not constitutionally vested in any of the three
branches,' 99 statutory authority has long permitted chief judges and
justices to assign and designate other judges to fill judicial vacancies. 20 0
Because Leahy's proposed system of judicial substitution neither allows
the Judiciary to impermissibly appropriate the power of another branch
nor permits another branch to confer its constitutionally designated
authority to the judiciary, the proposal does not violate the principles of
separation of powers.
Moreover, Leahy's proposal may actually further the functional

193. Id. at 705.
194. Id (explaining that a violation of separation of powers principles requires both
questions to be answered affirmatively).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Although the Morrison majority agreed that "the functions performed by the
independent counsel [we]re 'executive,"' the Court failed to regard the special
prosecutor's exercise of authority as interfering with the President's exercise of executive
power. Morrison,487 U.S. at 691.
198. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III (failing to vest the power to assign and designate
exclusively within any of the three branches).
199. See id
200. 28 U.S.C. § 291(a)-(b) (2006). Sections (a) and (b) respectively provide as
follows:
The Chief Justice of the United States may, in the public interest, designate and
assign temporarily any circuit judge to act as circuit judge in another circuit
upon request by the chief judge or circuit justice of such circuit.
The chief judge of a circuit or the circuit justice may, in the public interest,
designate and assign temporarily any circuit judge within the circuit, including
a judge designated and assigned to temporary duty therein, to hold a district
court in any district within the circuit.

Id.
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goals of separation of powers. In Mistretta v. United States,20 1 the Court
applied a pragmatic approach 20 2 to separation of powers when it upheld
the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, a statute that
established the United States Sentencing Commission "as an independent
commission in the judicial branch of the United States" tasked with
promulgating federal sentencing guidelines.20 3 The Mistretta Court
concluded that the statute did not impermissibly delegate legislative
power to the judicial branch because the non-delegation doctrine did not
prohibit Congress from enlisting assistance from the other two
branches.204
In considering the permissibility of Congress's delegation of power
to the Judiciary, the Mistretta Court applied the intelligible principles test
established by Chief Justice Taft:
So long as Congress "shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the
delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." 205
The Court also analogized the statute at issue to the various other
enabling acts through which Congress has delegated rulemaking
authority to the Judiciary.206
Additionally, in further support of its decision, the Mistretta Court
cited Chandlerv. Judicial Council,207 a case in which the Court upheld a
statute permitting the Judiciary to "make 'all necessary orders for the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts."' 2 08 By recognizing Congress's need to delegate "nonadjudactory
functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and
that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary," 20 9 the
Mistretta Court adopted a practical approach to separation of powers. 2 10
201. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
202. Eric R. Glitzenstein & Alan B. Morrison, The Supreme Court's Decision in
Morrison v. Olson: A Common Sense Application of the Constitution to a Practical
Problem, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 373 n.83 ("In Mistretta, the Court again reaffirmed its
pragmatic approach to the separation of powers doctrine.").
203. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368 (citing the language of the statute at issue, 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(a)).
204. Id. at 372.
205. Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928)).
206. Id. at 388.
207. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
208. Id. at 86 n.7.
209. Mistretta,488 U.S. at 388.
210. Id. at 372 (noting that Supreme Court "jurisprudence has been driven by a
practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, . . . Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives").
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Accordingly, Leahy's proposal furthers the functional goals of
separation of powers in that it merely provides the mechanism for the
Supreme Court to select the substitute Justices. 2 1 1 The selection of a
substitute Justice from a pool of Supreme Court retirees is akin to an
administrative task necessary for the proper operation of the Court.
Requiring Congress to choose a substitute would likely overburden the
Legislature with a task that is well within the purview of the Court.
Additionally, the proposed legislation contains sufficient intelligible
principles as to the operation of the selection process so as to pass muster
under Justice Taft's intelligible principles test. 2 12
The goal of separation of powers is to prevent the concentration of
power in one branch. 2 13 Leahy's proposal allows a majority of the active
Justices to reshape the composition of the Court for a given case if there
is a recusal-based vacancy. 214 Yet, although this proposal vests a
considerable amount of power in the Court, this power is limited because
all of the substitutes among whom the active Justices are choosing have
already gone through the process of nomination and confirmation. 215 As
retirees, each of the possible substitutes has been previously approved by
the two other branches of government to serve on the Court.
Consequently, because retired Justices have already been appointed in
accordance with the constitutional requirements, the balance of powers
between the branches remains intact.
B.

Desirabilityof Senator Leahy's Proposal2 16

Senator Leahy believes that his proposed legislation will remedy
many of the problems that stem from the Court's current judicial recusal
practices.21 Creating a policy for judicial replacement in the event of
recusal would ideally encourage Justices to recuse themselves when they
should, thus eliminating the perception of judicial impropriety resulting
from the refusal to recuse. 2 18
By codifying a practical and
straightforward procedure for judicial substitution, Leahy hopes that
Justices will "feel free to recuse themselves when they have a conflict in
211. S. 3781, 111th Cong. (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29, 2010).
212. Mistretta,488 U.S. at 372.
213. Id. at 381-82.
214. S.3781.
215. Id.
216. Leahy's proposal may prove to be more financially sound than other proposals
because retired Justices remain on the government's payroll. See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
However, this Section of the Comment is limited solely to the functional and procedural
advantages of Leahy's legislation. Any potential financial benefits of Leahy's proposed
system of substitution may require further analysis.
217. Should Retired JusticesBe CalledBack to the Supreme Court?,supra note 1.
218. Barnes, supra note 174.
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a specific case."2 1 9
This legislation would effectively render obsolete the frequentlyinvoked common law justifications for refusing to recuse. The duty to sit
and the rule of necessity would no longer remain valid grounds for denial
of recusal motions because Leahy's substitution system provides litigants
with available alternative judgeS220 and thus a forum for litigation.
Furthermore, not only may Justices feel more inclined to recuse
themselves when their impartiality has been reasonably questioned, but
litigants may also feel more comfortable questioning judicial impartiality
knowing that this judicial proxy system will prevent the possibility of an
equally divided Court.
Moreover, this system of substitution will help avoid the practical
problems that arise from judicial recusal such as procedural affirmances,
which prevent the clear resolution of legal issues. Under Leahy's
proposal, a substitute Justice's vote would necessarily preclude
procedural affirmances by an equally divided Court.
Because use of this policy is limited to circumstances involving
recusal of an active justice,22' it will not be employed as a means of
filling permanent vacancies on the Court.222 According to Professor
Howard J. Bashman, such use could pose separation of powers concerns
by "diminish[ing] the pressure on the Senate to promptly confirm a
replacement."22 3 Consequently, such a policy would undermine the
important process of judicial confirmation.
Similarly, Bashman's
argument likely applies to diminished pressure on the executive to
promptly nominate a replacement.
Although carefully crafted, Leahy's proposal is not without flaws.
Because the substitute Justices are chosen only from retired Supreme
Court Justices, 224 Leahy's proxy system would be impracticable if there
were no living or competent retired Justices. Additionally, although
Leahy's proposal details the mechanism for assigning substitute
Justices, 2 2 5 he fails to provide any procedure for the removal of
substitutes. Removal may be necessary in circumstances where, after a

219. Id.
220. See S. 3781, § 1(2).
221. S. 3781, § 1(2) (requiring the recusal of "any active justice" as the threshold
condition before invoking this system of judicial substitution).
222. Howard J. Bashman, Avoiding Recusal-Based Tie Votes at the U.S. Supreme
Court, LAW.COM
(March
4,
2008),
http://www.1aw.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1204544938947.
223. Id.
224. S. 3781, § 1 (limiting designation and assignment to "retired Chief Justice[s] or
Associate Justice[s]").
225. Id. ("[A] majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that retired
Chief Justice or Associate Justice.").
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competent retired Justice is assigned, the proxy becomes physically or
mentally incapacitated during the course of that substitute's temporary
tenure. 226
In spite of its shortcomings, Leahy's proposed system for
substituting Justices is desirable because it furthers the Court's role of
providing clear legal rules and resolving jurisdictional conflicts. 22 7 Not
only will this system of substitution likely increase judicial integrity, but
it will also increase the perception of judicial integrity and enhance
public confidence in the judicial system. Even in circumstances when a
judicial proxy cannot be successfully employed, the mere codification of
such a system would serve as a testament to the People's demand for an
impartial Court.228
V.

OTHER SOLUTIONS

Although Leahy's proposal has been the subject of much recent
attention, systems of judicial substitution are not uncommon. 2 29 Section
294 of the Judicial Code provides the rules governing the assignment and
designation of retired district court judges, circuit court judges, and
Supreme Court Justices to active duty. 23 0 Specifically, as Leahy has
pointed out in defense of his legislation, "retired [J]ustices . . . can sit on

any federal court, except the [C]ourt to which they were confirmed." 2 3 1
Additionally, many state constitutional or state statutory provisions
authorize the assignment of state court judges to other state courts. 232
226. Although removal power implications may be of interest, such implications are
not explored in this Comment and may require further study.
227. F. Andrew Hessick, supra note 111, at 695-700 (explaining how one's
understanding of the Court's proper role in society directly affects one's view as to the
ideal size of the Court). This concept could similarly be applied to one's attitude toward
recusal policy. Those who believe the more significant function of the Court is to
provide clear legal rules may be more inclined to favor Leahy's legislation than those
who believe that the Court's primary function should be to reach the "correct" answer.
Ideally, the Court's decisions should be both clear and correct. Although assessing
clarity tends to be objective, determining the "correctness" of a Court-issued decision is
subjective because such a determination depends on one's approach to constitutional
interpretation. Id.
228. According to one commentator, public opinion of the Court has recently declined
because the Justices are viewed as partisan and not impartial. See Editorial, Ethics,
Politics and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011, at A22.
229. Lubet, supra note 113, at 662 n.78.
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 294 (2006).
231. Barnes, supra note 174.
232. Lubet, supra note 113, at 674 (citing examples of states that provide for "the
temporary replacement of a disqualified Justice"). According to Lubet, California,
Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah have
constitutional provisions allowing for such a temporary replacement include, whereas
Indiana, Nevada, South Carolina, and South Dakota have enacted similar statutory
provisions. Id.
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Similar systems of judicial substitution also exist in several jurisdictions
outside of the United States.23 3
In addition to the federal, state, and foreign models of judicial
substitution, scholars and academics have proposed other possible
solutions to the problems created by recusal-based vacancies on the
United States Supreme Court. One option is to include all lower federal
judges in the pool of possible substitutes. By expanding the pool of
potential proxies, Leahy's proposal would no longer be rendered
impracticable in the absence of competent and willing retired Justices.
However, a significant objection to this option would be that district
court judges often have little, if any, federal appellate experience. Yet,
this objection is routinely overlooked when district court judges sit by
designation at the circuit court level as provided by Section 294.
Accordingly, Professor Bashman has suggested a mechanism
through which the replacement Justice would "be randomly selected
from among all non-recused [federal] circuit judges in regular active
duty."234 Yet, any proposal that expands the pool of substitute Justices to
anyone other than retired Supreme Court Justice may face constitutional
challenges under the Appointments Clause, which Leahy's proposal
manages to avoid. Supreme Court Justices are nominated and confirmed
by the executive and legislative branches, respectively. 235 They derive
their authority through these processes. Any proxy Justice on the High
Court who has not gone through the appointment process would lack the
requisite authority and credibility of an active or retired Supreme Court
Justice.
Assuming that retired Justices are the proper pool of individuals
from whom to choose, the question remains as to who or what is the
proper individual or entity to select the substitute. Under Leahy's
proposal, the nine active Justices of the current court choose the
substitute through a majority vote.236 Another option is to allow the
recused Justice to pick the substitute, although such a model would
undermine the purpose and effect of the recusal itself. The recused
Justice would likely hand-pick the retiree most likely to vote in
alignment with how the recused Justice would have voted. Thus, the
recused Justice would be essentially voting by proxy. Another similar
option would be to allow the Chief Justice to choose the substitute, but
233.

Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Regulating the Supreme Court, 2006 SING. J. LEGAL

STUD. 60, 82 (2006) (noting the existence of judicial substation provisions in Canada,

New Zealand, and South Africa).
234. Bashman, supra note 222.
235. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
236. S. 3781, 111th Cong. § 1 (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 29,
2010).

282

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:1

237
that approach would effectively give the Chief Justice two votes.
Perhaps a better option would be for the parties to agree on the substitute
akin to the process of selecting a mediator in alternative dispute
resolution.
Another alternative is simply to do nothing and maintain the status
quo. A strict formalist would likely argue that a 4-4 deadlock resulting
in a procedural affirmance is preferable to a 5-4 decision wherein the
238
deciding vote has been cast by a substitute Justice.
Under Leahy's plan, the composition of the Court would be subject
to change within any given term. According to Professor Sample,
conservatives remain skeptical of Leahy's proposal because the three
living retired Justices are left-leaning. 2 3 9 Thus, the substitution of any
one of them may result in more "liberal" decisions. Sample has
proposed creating a plan for judicial substitution now but postponing
implementation of that plan for several years so that "the replacement
pool would likely be different." 24 0 The legislation may have more
success in Congress if the Republican legislators do not feel threatened
by the return of left-leaning Justices who tend to vote against Republican
Party interests.241

VI. CONCLUSION
Recusal-based vacancies on the Supreme Court are problematic, but
judicial refusal to recuse is even more troubling. Rather than serving as
an exemplar of proper judicial recusal practices, the Supreme Court has
carved out its own exceptions to the federal recusal standard. In its 1993
Statement of Recusal Policy, the Court indicated that its unique nature
justifies a less demanding standard than that which governs all other
federal judges. The governing federal recusal standard aims to prevent
both actual and perceived impartiality. Consequently, judicial refusal to
recuse, especially when endorsed by the highest Court, undermines the
integrity of the American adjudicatory system by decreasing public
confidence in the Judiciary.
In denying recusal motions, Supreme Court Justices have often cited
the functional problems that result from Supreme Court recusals such as
the possibility of 4-4 deadlocks and procedural affirmances. Senator
237. Barnes, supra note 174.
238. Orrin Hatch, a Republican Senator from Utah and former Chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, fails to recognize the practical problems created by the Court's
current judicial recusal practices. Leahy Introduces Bill to Allow Retired Justices to
Serve, supra note 123. According to Hatch, "A tie vote is still a result." Id.
239. Barnes, supra note 174.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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Leahy's proposed legislation provides a viable solution to these problems
by creating a mechanism for judicial substitution. Allowing retired
Supreme Court Justices to sit in place of recused Justices eliminates the
possibility of procedural affirmances by an equally divided Court. Thus,
if Leahy's proposal is adopted Justices may be more inclined to recuse
themselves when they should. At the very least, however, Leahy's
proposal would invalidate the frequently-invoked justifications for nonrecusal.
Although not flawless, Senator Leahy's proposed bill will likely
pass constitutional muster. First, Congress possesses the authority to
enact such legislation pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Second, Leahy's proposed legislation will not violate the Appointments
Clause. The substitute Justices created by Leahy's legislation are
appropriately categorized as inferior officers because of the brevity and
infrequency of their role in the overall functioning of the Court and
because of their limited involvement in specific, discrete matters. Not
only may Congress lawfully delegate the authority for appointing inferior
officers, but the Judiciary also has the power, pursuant to the
Constitution, to appoint them. Additionally, because Leahy's legislation
merely enables the assignment of previously-appointed officers, it does
not violate the Appointments Clause.
Finally, Leahy's proposal does not contravene the principles of
separation of powers. His proposed system of judicial substitution does
not allow the Judiciary to impermissibly appropriate the power of
another branch nor does the legislation permit another branch to confer
its constitutionally-designated authority to the judiciary.
Leahy's proposed legislation provides a realistic solution to the
problems created by recusal-based vacancies. Although this system of
substitution does not work in every conceivable scenario, it is preferable
to other possible alternatives and should be fully endorsed. Ideally,
Leahy's proposal will be the next step in the long-evolving policy of
judicial recusal.
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